Key Agreement
summary
Proves tight concrete security for HMQV and NAXOS under new multi‑user assumptions and the generic group model, replacing previous S^2 forking losses with reductions to a q-CorrGapCDH assumption plus random oracles and DDH oracles, yielding restoreable 128‑bit security when using 256‑bit curves; formalizes wireless channel key exchange as a game with a probe oracle and shows practical key rates of 0.5–15 bits/sec (15s–8min for a 256‑bit key), proposes composition with real-random PAKE and finds concrete attacks in earlier proposals.
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chapters (17)
- 0:00Intro
- 2:14Tight Security
- 3:57AKE and Tightness
- 8:51The HMQV and NAXOS Protocol
- 13:57Multi-User CDH Problems with Corruptions
- 16:27Security Proof
- 18:31Generic Bounds and Bit Security
- 22:56Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE)
- 24:05Physical Layer Security (PLS)
- 25:53Wireless-channel Key Exchange (WIKE)
- 27:06Fundamental Channel Assumptions
- 32:40Probe and Execute
- 34:56Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE)
- 36:27RoR Security Model for (WIKE PAKE)
- 38:50Black-box Composition Result
- 40:36Summary of Contributions
- 41:00Open Questions
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