Cyberwar and the Law of Armed Conflict
summary
Argument: traditional Law of Armed Conflict dates from the 19th century and is ill‑suited to cyberspace because attribution and the conflict threshold matter; there are No cyberwar crime convictions yet despite case studies (NotPetya’s indiscriminate spread, the power grid as a dual‑use target, North Korean hacks on US hospitals, Khuzestan Steel outage, Russian strikes on Bulgarian ministries/Poland) and estimates like 25 Russian war‑crime convictions vs Ukraine’s alleged 60,000 plus incidents; Tallinn Manual, Geneva and Rome statutes guide analysis but attribution beyond reasonable doubt and proportionality remain decisive.
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chapters (18)
- 0:00RSAConference 2023
- 6:44International Criminal Court to Investigate
- 8:43Genocide?
- 13:14Russia's Cyberwar
- 21:37When Does the Law of Armed Conflict Apply?
- 23:01Conflicts vs Wars
- 24:59Fundamental Principles of LOAC/IHL
- 25:31Principle of Distinction
- 29:26Limiting Unnecessary Suffering
- 29:56Military Necessity
- 31:44Four Key Challenges
- 34:09Cyber & Direct Participation
- 40:26Case Study Analysis Questions
- 40:59North Korea Attacks US Healthcare System
- 42:49Bulgarian Government Hit By Cyberattack Blamed On Russian Hacking Group
- 44:03Russian government hackers have likely penetrated critical Ukrainian computer systems, U.S. says
- 44:224 Russia attempts to destabilize Poland with cyberattacks
- 46:44Next Steps
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