Protecting the Attack Surface and Data Silos of an EV Charging Network
summary
EV chargers expose concrete, tested failures: default creds and open services (Telnet, FTP, SMTP), Bluetooth/Wi‑Fi and mobile app entry points, and manufacturer backdoors that have let vendors or attackers overwrite screens and force hardware replacement. Pen testers (Kaspersky, Pen Test Partners) extract firmware, keys and source code in minutes from ChargePoint and EO units, demonstrating a plausible charger botnet and regional grid destabilization if many fast chargers are corralled. Field stats: some regions see ~50% offline, US averages ~70% uptime; OCPP 1.6 unencrypted remains a major protocol gap.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (18)
- 0:00Introduction and background
- 1:57EV chargers as IoT devices
- 4:04Automobile-charger interaction
- 6:31Types and vulnerabilities of chargers
- 8:40Real-world charger hacks
- 10:05Charger reliability and downtime
- 11:07Home charger fire risks
- 12:31Kaspersky’s charger security analysis
- 13:59Pen Test Partners’ charger exploit
- 14:42Backend systems and data silos
- 15:45Charger network connections
- 17:34Cyber threats to the power grid
- 18:37ChargePoint management systems
- 19:40OCPP protocol security gaps
- 20:46Government cybersecurity efforts
- 21:52Best practices for charger security
- 22:38Future of EV charging security
- 23:23Q&A session
related talks
17mHotWire: Real-World Impersonation and Discharge Attacks on Electric Vehicle Charging...
16mCAUTION: HIGH VOLTAGE, LOW SECURITY – A Familiar Tale of...
11mShort: Breaking the Charge: Exploiting State Manipulation in EV Charging
35mGridlock: The Dual-Edged Sword Of EV And Solar APIs In Grid Security
14mCharge It to My Neighbor: A Relay Attack on ISO 15118 Plug and Charge Payment
29mX-in-the-Middle: Attacking Fast Charging Piles and Electric Vehicles
13mDrainDead: Emptying Batteries of Parked Electric Vehicles
41mPanel: Tackling Automotive Hardware Vulnerabilities