Russia’s RT Leads Global Disinformation to Bypass Censorship on Ukraine
summary
Researchers trace an RT-sponsored Telegram channel that seeds videos into a coordinated inauthentic behavior network and find the pipeline: Telegram launchpad, paid downloaders, sockpuppet uploads, and a matching post syntax (flag emoji + language hashtag + channel handle). Investigation documents 123 Twitter accounts and 326 posts from April–Oct 2022, scheduled posts via TweetDeck, deepfake profile photos, embassy and state media boosting, geographic focus in annexed regions (39% Donetsk) and content translated into 20 languages as part of propaganda laundering.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Introduction to RT’s disinformation mission
- 1:24RT’s censorship circumvention strategies
- 3:55Propaganda laundering via Telegram
- 10:43Understanding Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior
- 12:29CIB research methods and red flags
- 16:38Twitter network analysis findings
- 23:44Cross-platform influence operations
- 26:18Impact and broader Russian influence landscape
- 27:43Advice for detecting disinformation
- 31:38Q&A on timing and platform responses
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