Responding to Supply Chain Vulnerabilities – A Maritime Perspective
summary
Claims five systemic weaknesses in ports: spoofable AIS/GPS (example: tanker faked position; GPS meaconing moved ships 20 miles), a three‑year Port of Antwerp compromise that removed containers, and primitive crane/load algorithms that have broken ships in half after manipulated manifests. Identifies tools and fixes: use the unified kill chain mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, apply functional decomposition down to field‑replaceable units, segment networks, require MFA, deploy IEC 62443‑style secure hardware with root of trust, and remediate highest‑risk exploited CVEs within months.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00Start
- 5:18Improper Container Loading
- 5:54Improper Load Distribution Consequences
- 10:33USTRANSCOM Port Risk Assessment
- 12:46The Unified Kill Chain
- 14:17Functional Decomposition of Hybrid Supply Chain
- 17:40Apply Kill Chain to Maritime Supply Chain
- 18:56Automated Maritime Attack Surface
- 19:54Specific Physical Material Vulnerabilities
- 20:39Specific software supply chain vulnerabilities
- 26:00Securing Complex Multimodal Supply Chains
- 30:02Integrating IT and OT Security
- 31:20ARM Chip Architecture
- 32:46Apply What You Have Learned Today
- 34:16References
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