Geopolitical Resilience: Why Operational Resilience Is No Longer Enough
summary
Argues that operational recovery is insufficient and organizations must plan for deglobalization, sanctions and forced market exits, backed by examples: the Maersk NotPetya cascade from a small Kyiv tax vendor, onshoring moves like the CHIPS Act and IRA, and Microsoft’s active support to keep Ukrainian infrastructure online. Cites a 40% drop in cyber investment year-over-year and firms seeing rapid AI adoption (one company reports 30% of new code written with co-pilot). Recommends CISOs earn a seat at the table, build values‑grounded geopolitical plans, and join public‑private sharing (ISACs, CISA).
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Introduction and speakers
- 3:12Why operational resilience isn't enough
- 10:31Security 3.0 and de-globalization
- 15:30AI arms race and collective defense
- 27:16Microsoft's role in Ukraine
- 31:48AI's rapid adoption and risks
- 33:53Supply chain shifts and cyber threats
- 37:48Call to action and geopolitical resilience plans
- 40:13Q&A on CISO reporting structure
- 44:32Q&A on geopolitical intelligence resources
- 45:56Q&A for non-profits and cyber poverty line
- 47:49Q&A on private companies and regulation
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