CAUTION: HIGH VOLTAGE, LOW SECURITY – A Familiar Tale of...
summary
Demonstrates an ISO 15118‑2 SLAC vulnerability where a lab-built man‑in‑the‑middle via self‑reported signal forces pairing between car and charger, reads full control‑pilot traffic, and attempts an overcharge by requesting 430 V (supply trips on hardware safety, so attack doesn’t fry hardware but still breaks session). Uses EV/EVSE simulators, breakout box and Control Pilot logging. Finds open IPv6 ports with writable PIB, unsecured Modbus allowing remote current‑limit and RFID bypass, unsigned firmware via debug ports, and multiple CVEs issued.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (9)
- 0:00Industry challenges
- 1:57EV charging communication
- 4:04ISO 15118-2 slack protocol
- 7:11STRIDE threat model
- 8:56IPv6 attack surface on DC charger
- 10:20Modbus config in level two charger
- 11:44Firmware signing vulnerability
- 12:27Industry maturity and plug and charge
- 14:58Preventing breaches and call to action
related talks
31mProtecting the Attack Surface and Data Silos of an EV Charging Network
17mHotWire: Real-World Impersonation and Discharge Attacks on Electric Vehicle Charging...
11mShort: Breaking the Charge: Exploiting State Manipulation in EV Charging
41mPanel: Tackling Automotive Hardware Vulnerabilities
34mBack-connect to the Connected Car. Search for Vulnerabilities in the VW Electric Car.
40mSecuring the Connected Car
51mSteering Clear of Danger: Decrypting the Realities of Remote Car Hacking
10mShort: PIBuster: Exploiting a Common Misconfiguration in CCS EV Chargers