Securing the Connected Car
Talkat Embedded Linux Conference + OpenIoT Summit North America 2017 · on Wednesday, 2017-02-22· at 10:30· Galleria South·
summary
Shows how attackers guess a Wi‑Fi hotspot seed, chain a multimedia vuln to a breached Sprint 3G link, and update V850 firmware to gain write access to the CAN bus, enabling remote control of steering and brakes and triggering 1.4 million vehicles recalled. Covers OTA practices that work in production like Tesla’s feature updates, contrasts SHA-256 integrity checks and phased rollouts versus package vs full‑image tradeoffs, notes 110 days average patch lag and the need for authenticated, rollback‑aware updates.
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chapters (19)
- 0:00Intro
- 3:11Session overview
- 4:04Software defined car: New revenue streams
- 5:16Cost savings by using open source platforms
- 7:08The software defined car requires OTA updates
- 8:40Jeep Cherokee hacked in July 2015
- 9:52Jeep Cherokee Head Unit with Wifi
- 11:14Wifi-based breach: Short-range
- 13:04The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus
- 15:40Putting it together
- 18:00More complexity leads to larger attack surface
- 19:31Security patching is done too late
- 21:33Why security patching happens too late
- 22:46Patching connected devices is harder
- 26:07Generic embedded updater workflow
- 26:52Choice of update type has tradeoffs
- 29:17Strategies to reduce the risk of bricking
- 32:46Prepare for securing the software defined car
- 34:06The best way to respond to hacking?
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