Cybersecurity in Post Quantum Era
summary
Quantum-capable machines will break RSA/ECDSA/ECDH via Shor’s algorithm once error‑corrected quantum devices reach roughly 4,000 qubits for 2048‑bit RSA; Grover’s algorithm only forces larger symmetric keys so doubling key lengths suffices. NIST selects Kyber for KEM and Dilithium, Falcon, SPHINCS+ for signatures; NSA and others push migration with a 2025–2030 window. Libraries such as liboqs and prototype integrations into TLS, SSH and IPsec exist; lattice schemes fit constrained protocols better than huge‑key alternatives like classic McEliece.
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chapters (26)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:14About the project
- 0:42Challenges
- 1:03Motivation
- 2:15DWave
- 2:55Quantum Computing
- 3:21Short Algorithm
- 5:46Gruber argonitum
- 6:35Quantum Cryptography
- 8:52Post Quantum Cryptography
- 9:50Lattice Based Cryptography
- 10:47Post Quantum Crypto
- 11:12Codebased Crypto
- 11:57Hashbased Crypto
- 12:24Comparison
- 13:44Post Quantum Standardization
- 16:26Size of keys
- 18:00What should be done
- 21:54Timeline
- 23:21Protocols
- 25:47TLS
- 26:48SSH
- 27:23Certificates
- 27:52Proposal
- 28:36Conclusion
- 29:40Questions
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