Post-Quantum Cryptography
summary
By 2025 big quantum machines could exist and attackers who record today’s traffic can decrypt it later: Shor’s algorithm breaks RSA DH and elliptic curves, so public‑key handshakes and long‑term signatures are at risk. Symmetric ciphers lose about half their bits of security so move to AES‑256 for bulk encryption and consider hash‑ or code‑based signatures now. Practical options include McEliece‑style code‑based encryption (key sizes ≈1 MB); NIST is running a standardization call over the next few years.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Start
- 0:54Cryptographic applications in daily life
- 2:38Universal quantum computers are coming, and are scary
- 4:45Physical cryptography: a return to the dark ages
- 6:16Is there any hope? Yes!
- 7:18NSA announcements
- 8:09Post-quantum becoming mainstream
- 14:11Initial recommendations
- 17:14Code-based Crypto
- 17:59Many more post-quantum suggestions
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