Symmetric Cryptography 2
summary
Two results: for 2‑key Triple DES the paper proves a tight multi‑user security bound and shows system security equals 112 − log2 q bits where q is total queries, finds FX‑style whitening only adds about eight bits, and derives the bound using a resampling method within a coefficient‑H proof so attacks cannot be improved. For AES‑192 the work corrects prior key‑schedule relations and gives improved meet‑in‑the‑middle recoveries on nine‑round AES‑192 that lower memory complexity by exploiting extra key relations while keeping time and data the same.
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chapters (14)
- 0:002-key triple DES results
- 3:36Known attacks on 2-key triple DES
- 7:15Single vs multi-user security
- 10:17Tight security proof for 2-key triple DES
- 13:08Why prior proofs failed
- 17:28Legacy systems with 2-key triple DES
- 19:37Future cryptographic recommendations
- 20:03AES-192 meet-in-the-middle attacks
- 22:12History of AES meet-in-the-middle
- 25:10Super-sbox and MixColumn properties
- 27:05Flaws in prior AES attacks
- 30:06AES-192 attack process
- 32:42Improved memory complexity trick
- 36:07AES-192 attack results
