Quantum Cyber Risk: How Deep and How Wide?
summary
Panel argues NIST will publish FIPS mid to late July and that the real work is testing drafts, running inventories and protocol updates now; expect 60–70% of effort on discovery and planning. NSA favors software post‑quantum cryptography over QKD for quickest protection; lattice schemes are chosen but large keys force protocol and performance changes. Tools exist for cryptography discovery (Crypto discovery tools), and coordinated guides like NCCoE SP 1838 plus sector playbooks help prioritize OT, IoT and supply‑chain upgrade paths.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (13)
- 0:00Welcome
- 1:49Panelists' roles
- 3:16Post-quantum crypto standards
- 6:10Crypto agility strategies
- 9:09Risk management
- 13:26Global PQC adoption
- 17:04Governance challenges
- 23:10Regulation vs risk management
- 28:53Industry collaboration
- 31:46Q&A
- 35:46QKD and hybrid crypto
- 40:45Hardware impact of PQ upgrades
- 44:17Closing
related talks
53mPanel: Migrating to Post-Quantum Schemes
48mPreparing for Quantum: A Pragmatic Approach towards Readiness
26mPreparing the United States for Post Quantum Cryptography
33mComparing Strategies for Quantum-Safe Cryptography Adoption in Organizations
21mCybersecurity in the Age of Quantum
20mCryptographic Resilience in the Quantum Era
19mAgile is the new black – Why Preparing for Postquantum Crypto also Matters to You!
01h 02mNIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Update