Harmonizing IT and OT Security in the Era of Convergence
summary
Claims IT/OT differ in goals and tooling: inventory via passive scanning plus physical walkdowns, not trusting CMDBs; active, careful fingerprinting and selective queries beat blunt network scans; most intrusions start in IT (social engineering ≈74%) and move laterally; patching in OT is rare (example cited ~4%), so risk is mitigated by phased segmentation, granular zones and containment. Practical techniques include a shared DMZ, a bastion jump host as a Purple‑Team starter, using EPSS and Atomic Red Team-style tests to validate controls and generate repeatable wins.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00IT and OT security convergence
- 1:05IT vs OT cultures
- 2:34Inventorying OT assets
- 9:00Segmentation beyond IT/OT
- 18:29Vulnerability management in OT
- 24:30Patching risks in OT
- 31:18Cross-functional OT teams
- 36:34Attackers in OT environments
- 42:17Purdue model limitations
- 46:28Purple teaming OT risks
- 48:58OT security lessons
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