Threshold Signatures and Fault Attacks
summary
Proposes a parameterized fault adversary model that records number of injections, location and timing precision, bit count, duration and fault type, maps clock/voltage glitch, EM and laser injections into two practical classes, and shows common fault analyses (DFA, SFA, SIFA) only need a fraction of those capabilities so many countermeasures either under- or over‑assume attackers; and constructs post‑quantum threshold signatures over general group actions using sequential commitments, Fiat–Shamir with precommitted randomness, and T‑out‑of‑N replicated sharing, yielding workable 2‑of‑3/3‑of‑5 sizes but exponential share growth for larger T.
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Fault adversary models
- 4:21Parameterized adversary model
- 7:29Fault injection mechanisms
- 10:43Fault analysis methods
- 13:54Countermeasures against faults
- 17:53Key takeaways
- 22:36Post-quantum threshold signatures
- 24:24From protocols to signatures
- 26:13Group actions in crypto
- 31:37Threshold signatures with group actions
- 34:09Securing against malicious users
- 38:54T-out-of-N threshold signatures
- 41:26Future research directions
- 44:51Q&A
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