DPI protected Verilog instead of encryption
summary
Encrypted Verilog is weak (see referenced ACM CCS paper) so the project compiles secret RTL with Verilator into a DPI-accessible shared object, shipping the wrapper and object instead of plaintext. The approach trades encryption for obfuscation via compiler, avoids leaking RTL, and is implemented: libraries build, pass Verilator CI, and run with XM. Significant limits remain — fixed top‑level parameters, simulator build matrix and packaging burdens — but the proof‑of‑concept works.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00The problem with IP distribution
- 1:03How encrypted IP works
- 2:00Limitations of current methods
- 4:00A Verilator-based alternative
- 6:55Advantages of compiled models
- 8:52Addressing technical hurdles
- 12:55Synthesis and future work
- 16:58Implementation and discussion
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