Standardization of Attested TLS Protocols
summary
IETF workgroup SEAT forms to standardize attested TLS and the team brings a candidate draft, ProVerif symbolic analysis, and industry partners (Arm, Intel, Siemens, etc.). Three integration options remain under debate: pre‑handshake shows replay, relay and diversion risks; intra‑handshake still allows relay/diversion because TLS 1.3 certificate_verify is not extensible; post‑handshake uses RFC 9261 exporters, works with older TLS, adds latency but gives stronger binding. The charter forbids changing TLS 1.3, so the standard must rely on existing exporters and prove proof‑of‑possession bindings.
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chapters (7)
- 0:00Introduction and motivation
- 3:53System model and threat model
- 10:10Security goals and relay attacks
- 13:26Mutual authentication and attestation
- 20:10TLS integration challenges
- 26:09Pre-intra-post handshake tradeoffs
- 30:04Q&A and open discussion
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