Secure IO
summary
Combined proposals converge on concrete mechanics: full guest images encrypted with hardware-bound keys, device identity attestation via SPDM, and a TSM/PSP boundary that binds virtual function to guest so devices move through locked→run→error states and directly DMA into confidential memory. Implementation details include an SPDM-secured channel, IDE PCI link protection, secure DMA via a new secure device table entry, and ephemeral session keys for EP11 crypto adapters. Work centers on vendor-neutral verbs and a ruthlessly simple MVP for upstream adoption.
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Introduction to Secure IO
- 1:11IBM’s approach to secure IO
- 5:31TDISP state machine overview
- 8:03RISC-V Secure IO specification
- 12:47Secure IO flow comparison
- 17:25Security and attestation discussion
- 21:27Community standards and principles
- 29:16TSM boundaries and dispatchers
- 30:18Guest acceptance and policy
related talks
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41mIntroducing IO Devices into Trusted Execution Environments
25mExploring I/O Support for Virtualization-Based Trusted Execution Environment
27mPCI device authentication & encryption
36mEverybody is talking about Confidential Computing - the minimum Devs should know
24mDiscussion: TDISP, VM migration, and paravisors
19mSupporting Trusted Virtual Machines with Hardware-based Secure Remote Memory