Supporting Trusted Virtual Machines with Hardware-based Secure Remote Memory
summary
Proposes TDM, a hardware engine that pairs with trusted VM features to encrypt, authenticate, and remotely map pages at page-granularity, perform ownership checks on donors, and randomize physical placement to guarantee obliviousness. Implements the engine on an FPGA prototype with onboard HBM, integrates with Linux frontswap and RDMA, and measures about 5% performance loss versus a high-performance software fastswap baseline while keeping confidentiality and integrity even if the hypervisor is compromised.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Trusted VMs and memory disaggregation
- 2:00Secure memory disaggregation challenges
- 5:36TDM hardware-based trusted memory
- 7:21TDM architecture and trusted components
- 8:24Swap-in with attacker security
- 10:30Swap-out and access obfuscation
- 11:52TDM integration with Linux VM
- 13:01Evaluation setup and hardware limits
- 14:05Performance vs Fast Swap
- 15:53Memory bandwidth analysis
- 16:14Conclusion and future work
- 16:38Q&A on CXL and memory tech
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