Exploring I/O Support for Virtualization-Based Trusted Execution Environment
summary
Current direct I/O forces TVM data into unprotected shared memory, requiring decrypt/copy-out and encrypt/copy-in steps that add noticeable latency; the proposed PCIe TDISp architecture instead authenticates and enrolls devices into the TVM TCB so they can use trusted TLP/IDE encryption and direct trusted MMO/DMA to access private memory, backed by SPDM-based attestation and new TDX module APIs and a TSM/TPA implementation; software changes in Linux/KVM are required and a prototype integration is described.
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chapters (4)
- 0:00Introduction and context
- 8:22TDISP architectural design
- 13:39Intel TDX implementation
- 22:49Conclusion and summary
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