Introducing IO Devices into Trusted Execution Environments
summary
Adds a concrete path to let a TDX guest directly use PCIe devices by building a per-device trust chain: SPDM attestation between device and host TSM/DSM, TDX module holding session keys, and per-link encryption for PCIe TLPs so devices can access confidential memory. VMM loads the TDX module, TPA/TPM acts as TSM, negotiate keys, create TDI unit of assignment, lock the TDI, verify device policy, then enable trusted MMIO and DMA remapping to remove copy-in/copy-out overhead.
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chapters (6)
- 0:00Start
- 3:01Current I/O virtualization technologies
- 10:16Requirements for TEE I/O
- 12:03TDISP: Architecture for Trusted I/O Virtualization
- 16:04TDISP Architecture Overview
- 32:12High-Level Software Flows: Step D Start the TDI
related talks
25mExploring I/O Support for Virtualization-Based Trusted Execution Environment
16mOpening the I/O gates with confidential containers
31mIntel Trust Domain Extensions
31mSecure IO
27mIntel Trusted Domain Extensions (TDX) Host Kernel Support
13mMaking PCI devices ready for confidential computing
26mVirtual TPM based attestation for Intel Trust Domain Extensions
24mDiscussion: TDISP, VM migration, and paravisors