AMD SEV-SNP Attestation: Establishing Trust in Guests
summary
SEV‑SNP produces a signed attestation report that lets a guest owner release secrets only after verifying concrete measurements: a committed TCB plus current/reported TCBs, chip ID and platform bits, a launch digest built page‑by‑page, and the guest‑owner‑signed ID block (image ID, policy, ID key fingerprint). The report is signed by a chip‑unique, versioned VCEK obtained from a key service; a secure SP↔guest channel delivers it and can bind an ephemeral guest key (in report data). Host tools expose this via Dev SEV get_report / get_extended_report.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:25AMD SEV-SNP Overview
- 1:31Threat Model - Untrusted Cloud Provider
- 6:35AMD SEV-SNP Attestation
- 7:24Measurements of Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
- 14:35Attestation Report: Platform Measurements
- 18:36Attestation Report: Guest Measurements
- 29:27Authenticity of Attestation Report
- 30:39Binding Guest Credentials to Attestation Report
- 32:53Retrieving Attestation Reports
- 40:10TCB Version Tracking
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