Device Attestation in Hardware TEE based Confidential Computing
summary
Describes a concrete device-attestation flow for hardware TEEs that uses SPDM management sessions and the TDISP/TDI interface to fetch x.509 chains, firmware measurements and device interface reports, and to negotiate IDE KM keys for DMA encryption. Shows two communication channels (management and data), explains why current bounce-buffer + copy/encrypt adds measurable overhead and how direct assignment with TSM/DSM and Intel TDX modules avoids it, and maps checks into kernel (MMIO ranges) versus user space (certificate/manifest) verification.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Start
- 12:33TEE-Device Communication
- 16:43Challenge of "Trusted" Device
- 17:56TEE-Device Local Attestation Model
- 20:39TEE-Device Remote Attestation Model
- 21:38TEE-Device Interface Verification
- 23:31Data need be verified
- 25:54How to verify the data
- 26:58Example
- 29:10Summary
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