Allowing an Intel TDX Module to Run Without SEAM
summary
Demonstrates running the Intel TDX module on ordinary hardware by bypassing SEAM loading and measurement: the buildable TDX image is copied into a host physical range, page tables and initial CPU state are fabricated, and KVM and TDX-module sources are patched so the module runs without SEAM support. Implementation replaces SIM instruction with jumps and tweaks KVM mm and guest ABI; it deliberately ignores memory encryption and attestation, so it works for development but sacrifices real TDX security guarantees.
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Start
- 1:06TDX: Trust Domain extensions
- 3:05SEAM: Secure Arbitration Mode
- 4:40Problem
- 5:33Goal
- 10:59TDX module: characteristics
- 12:45TDX module address layout
- 13:11Requirements
- 15:05Design points
- 15:18Loading TDX module
- 18:11Memory encryption
- 18:35Secure EPT
- 20:06TDVMCALL
- 20:49Conclusion
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