SEV-SNP Development Status Update
summary
Guest SEV‑SNP support and CPU ID security are upstream as of kernel 5.19; hypervisor patches are at version 6 with a v7 planned. Hardware enforces integrity via an RMP validated bit set by p‑validate, causing #VC on host tamper; KVM handles host/nested faults by splitting the directmap or signaling userland. Exploring UPM memfd backend and a KVM exit for batched GHCB conversions to avoid userland crashes and reduce exits; v7 changes flip pages back to shared instead of crashing.
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Start
- 1:46SEV-SNP SECURITY FEATURES: UPSTREAM STATUS
- 8:57KVM SUPPORT: SECURE NESTED PAGING
- 11:29RMP FAULT-HANDLING (HOST, #PF)
- 22:02UNMAPPED PRIVATE MEMORY
- 23:38UPM-PRIVATE MEMSLOTS
- 25:54UPM-IMPLICIT CONVERSIONS
- 29:51UPM: PROS/CONS
- 31:44FUTURE DEVELOPMENT WORK
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