PCI device authentication encryption
summary
A proof-of-concept in-kernel CMA‑SPDM RFC→non‑RFC patch set now aims to make the PCI core perform device authentication before driver probe, exposing an authenticated sysfs attribute and measurement files, plus a keyring and eight certificate slots (readable and writable where supported). The patches let user space trigger reauthentication, will add measurement retrieval, CSR handling and IDE (DHE) encryption, and plan handover of the SPDM session to a guest; SPDM’s single‑session limit forces a policy for kernel vs. TSM (TDX/SEV‑TIO/CCA) use.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Introduction to PCI device auth
- 1:03SPDM protocol overview
- 3:12Kernel vs TSM handling
- 10:13SPDM session limitations
- 12:22Virtual function support
- 14:33Encryption setup challenges
- 17:47Multi-vendor collaboration
- 27:50Current patch set features
- 28:53Measurement retrieval plans
- 36:01Certificate chain exposure
- 45:10Unsigned measurements handling
- 50:32Cloud provider use case
- 57:19Future work and wrap-up
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