Protecting the Linux Kernel from Confidential Computing Threats in Virtual Environments
Talkat Linux Security Summit North America 2024 · on Thursday, 2024-04-18· at 09:05· Terrace Suite 1+2·
summary
Kernel documentation now includes the Confidential Computing Threat Model for Virtual Environments and virtio declares compliance; engineers audit interrupt handlers above vector 30 and merge fixes (PCI/MSI and interrupt checks) after the AO/Heckler exploit that flips EAX via host-injected interrupts to bypass SSH auth. Work builds a runtime device filter (binary scpi table) to whitelist PCI devices, hardens RNG sources with RDRAND fallback and lands patches, and prototypes the SVSM secure-BM service module to intercept PIO/MMIO, DMA and alternate interrupt injection; many drivers and attestation workflows remain unresolved.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Linux kernel protection in cloud
- 2:09Threat models in confidential cloud
- 7:01Legacy vs confidential threats
- 10:12Data confidentiality in guests
- 12:18Heckler attacks on VMs
- 17:36Interrupt-based attack mitigation
- 19:02Randomness in confidential guests
- 21:31Kernel driver attack surface
- 24:41Trusted device connections
- 27:55SBSM role explained
- 33:59Wrap-up and future challenges
- 34:41Q&A on device filtering
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