Secure IO BoF
summary
Discussion argues for a single Linux guest‑to‑host ABI that maps generic verbs (notably info verb and a guest‑initiated rebind), with per‑vendor hypercall translation and hooks in IOMMU drivers for bind/unbind. Target vendors are RISC‑V, AMD and Intel; V1 requirement is an info + accept path (if device already bound), V2 adds host‑assisted rebind. Proposes a userland dispatcher like TSMFD, keeps SPDM calls via the TSM/VM, and prefers coarse‑grained teardown (kill guest on V1 errors).
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Introduction and stakes
- 2:09Common guest to host interface
- 8:49Device enumeration in guest
- 17:11Common ABI for TSM operations
- 26:38TSM and VMM cooperation
- 31:11IDE key management discussion
- 37:11IOMMU driver integration
- 43:51Recovery and TSM failure
- 51:06Summary and next steps
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