Monitoring Strategy for the Coming Space 5G Network
summary
Claims that DHS CDM-style architecture maps to Space 5G, with a reference design using Elastic Stack and Kibana to ingest logs. Defines two concrete threats: link attacks against UE–gNodeB over satellite and compromise of satellite command‑and‑control (C2) that disrupts orbit/attitude and breaks low‑latency links. Notes practical hurdles: AMF visibility loss when VNFs move, bespoke RF/front‑end parsers required, intermittent telemetry from non‑geostationary satellites and severe bandwidth limits, and recommends out‑of‑band monitoring plus Space ISAC feeds.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:07Agenda
- 2:17Background on 5G
- 7:55Threat Model
- 12:31Threat Model 2
- 15:21Core Components
- 20:01ISAC
- 22:18Space Vehicle
- 29:56Action Items
- 32:47Conclusion
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