Building Trust in Supply Chains
summary
Claims a Cyber‑Physical Security Platform that models production with a VCP model, collects sensor logs and operational steps, and compiles digital evidence to generate linked certificates kept in a Trust Store so acquirers can verify change management and conformance automatically. Examples: SolarWinds’ injected build malware and Sunburst might be caught by build-process checks; past incidents include over 10,000 PCs infected by ransomware and a ~3% quarterly sales drop. Work is moving to IIC results and ISO/IEC standardization.
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chapters (20)
- 0:00Start
- 0:22Introduction
- 4:18Chip manufacturing line halted by malware
- 5:07Chip embedded on server motherboard for attacking
- 5:41Fraudulent inspections of industrial rubber product
- 9:42Analysis of Solar Winds Breach
- 10:29Incident analysis (2)
- 12:02Incidents propagate
- 12:24Risks and requirements on trust
- 13:28Basic concepts (1)
- 15:11Making full use of cyber physical space technologies
- 16:16Shifting rule keeping to the cyber physical space
- 16:53Digital evidence and certificate of rule keeping
- 17:24Certificates build trust
- 18:25Effects
- 22:14Society 5.0
- 22:43Value Creation Process
- 23:08Conformance Validation
- 23:36Trust Store
- 24:01Secure Data-tracking
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