Untrusted Execution: Attacking the Cloud Native Supply Chain
summary
Argues that supply chain compromise happens at source, CI, build host and runtime and that real defenses are provenance and tamper detection not slogans. Recommends generate SBOMs and VEX attestations for dependencies, use in-toto/TUF-style pipeline metadata plus cosign/rekor signatures, run witness to trace build behavior and aim for SALSA level 3–4 with reproducible builds so geographically redundant builds yield identical hashes. Notes simple wins: minimal base images (no bash) and ask vendors for SBOMs and MTTR data.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Introduction
- 2:47Cloud native supply chain problem
- 7:43Supply chain attacks in practice
- 11:13Supply chain security challenges
- 13:21Threat modeling for supply chain
- 21:55Government frameworks and standards
- 28:40Hardening base images
- 33:36Build provenance tooling
- 34:44Maturing supply chain security
- 35:11Q&A
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