Shuffling and Friends
summary
Paper presents a lattice-based verifiable shuffle for known content that combines Baum et al. commitments and Lyubashevsky–Neven verifiable encryption to build an e‑voting system with return codes; implementation reports 32 ms per vote and 17 KB per vote, about five times faster and ≥50% smaller than del Pino et al. A separate argument replaces N challenges with only two verifier challenges via PM‑evidential polynomials (Phi_i = X^i + Y). A cryptanalysis shows how non‑membership witnesses let an attacker recover Alpha from few non-membership witnesses (and reconstruct CRS‑based secrets) and proposes fixes.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:30Outline
- 1:56Overview
- 3:23Primitives
- 4:13Shuffle Protocol
- 6:24Voting System
- 8:58Performance
- 10:36Introduction
- 13:15The general approach
- 14:55The Verificatum approach
- 17:03PM-evidential polynomials
- 22:02Accumulators
- 28:36Au et al. DUA - The CRS-based construction
- 30:26The Witness Forgery Attack - Key Idea
- 31:45Conclusions
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