Encrypted Access Logging for Online Accounts: Device Attributions without...
summary
Proposes client-side encrypted access logging that embeds E2E-encrypted device identifiers using OS-managed keys and FIDO2-style attestations so account activity interfaces show unspoofable device IDs without revealing them to the service. Provides formal definitions for privacy, session unlinkability, and an impossibility result that full log recovery and full privacy cannot both hold, characterizes decryptability via a reachability graph, implements a proof-of-concept Python system that adds one login round trip and milliseconds of overhead, and requires OS-vendor deployment and trust.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Encrypted access logging intro
- 1:35IPV survivor risks
- 3:43Account security interface flaws
- 4:45CESL protocol with OS support
- 7:32Threat model and goals
- 9:41Encrypted device identifiers
- 10:01Security definitions and limits
- 11:47Deployment architecture
- 13:54WebAuthn and FIDO2 inspiration
- 15:17Proof of concept and performance
- 15:58Future work and OS collaboration
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