Secure, Precise, and Fast Floating-Point Operations on x86 Processors
summary
Claims a practical defense that closes floating point side channels on x86 while preserves precision of non‑secure executions by combining exploitation of microarchitectural behaviors with novel compiler transformations, implements a runtime/compile stack to mute timing and state leaks, measures closure of more side channels than prior work, and reports low overhead with an order of magnitude faster cost on a set of microkernels compared to the previous best solution.
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chapters (6)
- 0:00Introduction
- 4:50Floating-point instructions
- 10:01Side-channel attacks
- 17:02Validation and performance
- 23:17Security implications
- 27:39Secure flight operations
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