Shielding Software From Privileged Side-Channel Attacks
summary
Defends against page-table and last-level-cache side channels a compromised OS can launch by removing page-table mappings from the kernel dirac map, disabling lazy allocation for a secure user space, and partitioning the LLC with Intel Cache Allocation Technology. Prototype Apparition builds on an optimized Virtual Ghost, forces kernel instrumentation, and manages physical allocation. Evaluation on FreeBSD shows defenses add 1–18% overhead (one app up to 86% in paper) and blocks page-fault and Prime+Probe leakage.
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chapters (18)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:43OS-Launched Side-Channel Attacks
- 1:52Why Shielding Systems Don't Help
- 2:33Outline
- 3:03Page Table Side Channels
- 3:59LLC Side Channel: Prime + Probe Attack
- 5:52Background on Virtual Ghost
- 6:53Protected Memory Regions
- 7:39Apparition
- 9:17Paging Side Channels Defenses
- 10:35Intel Cache Allocation Technology
- 11:26Cache Partitioning Configuration
- 12:32Private Cache Partitions for Applications
- 13:37Spectre and Meltdown Attacks
- 14:23Methodology
- 15:43Page Table Side-Channel Defenses Overheads
- 18:40LLC Side-Channel Defenses Overheads
- 19:54Conclusion
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