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Shielding Software From Privileged Side-Channel Attacks

Talkat USENIX Security '18 · on Friday, 2018-08-17· at 14:45· Grand Ballroom 7-10· [security]
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Defends against page-table and last-level-cache side channels a compromised OS can launch by removing page-table mappings from the kernel dirac map, disabling lazy allocation for a secure user space, and partitioning the LLC with Intel Cache Allocation Technology. Prototype Apparition builds on an optimized Virtual Ghost, forces kernel instrumentation, and manages physical allocation. Evaluation on FreeBSD shows defenses add 1–18% overhead (one app up to 86% in paper) and blocks page-fault and Prime+Probe leakage.

AI-written summary · about

  1. 0:00Intro
  2. 0:43OS-Launched Side-Channel Attacks
  3. 1:52Why Shielding Systems Don't Help
  4. 2:33Outline
  5. 3:03Page Table Side Channels
  6. 3:59LLC Side Channel: Prime + Probe Attack
  7. 5:52Background on Virtual Ghost
  8. 6:53Protected Memory Regions
  9. 7:39Apparition
  10. 9:17Paging Side Channels Defenses
  11. 10:35Intel Cache Allocation Technology
  12. 11:26Cache Partitioning Configuration
  13. 12:32Private Cache Partitions for Applications
  14. 13:37Spectre and Meltdown Attacks
  15. 14:23Methodology
  16. 15:43Page Table Side-Channel Defenses Overheads
  17. 18:40LLC Side-Channel Defenses Overheads
  18. 19:54Conclusion
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