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Tackling runtime-based obfuscation in Android with TIRO

Talkat USENIX Security '18 · on Friday, 2018-08-17· at 11:10· Grand Ballroom 1-4· [security, android]
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TIRO implements Target-Instrument-Run-Observe and ships an instrumented ART runtime that detects six concrete runtime tampering techniques (Dex value hooking, bytecode overwriting, art method hooking, entry‑point/code‑pointer swaps). It automatically extracts modified bytecode, synthesizes methods, and feeds results back to static analysis, revealing on average +30 sensitive API uses per app. On a Google-labeled set TIRO needs 2.3 iterations and finds runtime obfuscation in 53% of samples; on 2000 VirusTotal samples 80% are runtime-based. Native-only obfuscation remains a known evasion.

AI-written summary · about

  1. 0:00Intro
  2. 0:33Android malware and analysis
  3. 1:05Java obfuscation
  4. 2:09Native obfuscation
  5. 3:23Obfuscation via runtime tampering
  6. 4:10Unexpected code behavior
  7. 5:31Android Run Time (ART)
  8. 5:43ART code loading
  9. 7:06ART code execution
  10. 8:37Runtime state tampering in ART
  11. 9:51Targeted execution
  12. 10:50Dealing with obfuscation
  13. 11:16TIRO: A hybrid iterative deobfuscator
  14. 11:52Target - Instrument - Run - Observe
  15. 12:57Handling runtime-based obfuscation
  16. 13:38Runtime-based deobfuscation
  17. 14:48Iterative deobfuscation
  18. 15:08Implementation
  19. 15:35Evaluation
  20. 15:54TIRO: Detection and deobfuscation
  21. 17:43Obfuscation usage in malware
  22. 18:22Conclusion
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