The Second Crypto War—What's Different Now
summary
Argument: the current fight centers on locked mobile devices, not abstract end-to-end crypto; San Bernardino shows the FBI told courts only Apple could open a device then a consultant did and an inspector general found FBI hadn’t tried hard. Apple ties the user PIN to a device key and encrypts ~95% of phone data. Investigative tools include lawful hacking, CCTV, cell-tower metadata and automated license-plate readers; the National Academies review finds proposed exceptional‑access designs (e.g. Ozzie’s) unimplemented and untested. The US has 18,000 state and local police forces with limited digital-forensics capacity.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00The Apple encryption case
- 3:27History of the crypto wars
- 11:39Investigations in the digital age
- 21:18Digital investigative tools
- 25:09Challenges for law enforcement
- 29:45The Academy's encryption report
- 30:09Evaluating access solutions
- 33:29Critique of backdoor proposals
- 34:06Encryption and civil society
- 40:15Conclusion on security debates
- 41:34Audience Q&A
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