Protecting Privacy of BLE Device Users
summary
System implements a device-agnostic guardian using an Ubertooth One radio to learn per-device advertisement intervals, selectively jam advertisements, then advertise on behalf of the device while using Bluetooth Classic out-of-band pairing to convey secret connection parameters. Evaluation on real devices finds over 214 device types observable, reduces attacker effective range so an adversary must be within ~1 m when guardian is 3 m from the target, causes median accidental jams of zero, and adds up to 16% energy overhead on a Galaxy S5 when protecting 10 devices.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:32What is Bluetooth Low Energy?
- 1:17BLE Primer
- 2:32BLE Advertisements
- 4:27BLE Security and Privacy
- 5:13BLE Privacy & Security Effectiveness
- 7:59Research Questions
- 9:10BLE-Guardian
- 9:52High-level Description
- 10:49Device Hiding
- 13:57Access Control
- 17:06Evaluation
- 20:57Conclusion
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