Securing firmware: Secure and Trusted boot in OpenBMC
summary
OpenBMC implements a hardware root of trust on newer BMC SoCs so the boot ROM verifies a small SPL image against one-time programmable keys (ASPEED 2600 confirms ~64KB verification), then SPL measures and verifies u-boot using signatures stored in a write-protected EEPROM and records measurements into an external TPM for remote attestation. The chain balances secure boot for the immutable first stage with measured/trusted boot afterwards so owners can rebuild and replace firmware while still proving what actually ran.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:20What is OpenBMC
- 6:00The history of OpenBMC
- 8:33Why do we care
- 9:13OpenBMC
- 11:16Device tree
- 13:00Demo
- 19:23Firmware
- 24:21Secure boot
- 26:39The downside
- 27:51Secure boot vs Trusted boot
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