Clevis and Tang: securing your secrets at rest
summary
Tang and Clevis implement network‑bound encryption: the server remains stateless and never learns client secrets, using the McCallum‑Relyea DH‑based exchange to let only the client reconstruct keys. A live demo binds a LUKS root volume, provisions three Tang servers and a TPM/SSS policy, and boots: automatic unlock succeeds when two of three Tang servers are available and fails when only one is up. Slides and code show JSON/JWE messages, HTTP transport and practical limitations (entropy, DoS, key rotation).
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Start
- 16:31Tang - assumptions
- 17:32Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement
- 19:53Diffie-Hellman key agreement
- 21:05Integrated Encryption Scheme (IES)
- 21:58McCallum-Relyea exchange
- 23:36McCallum-Relyea - provisioning
- 24:58McCallum-Relyea - decryption
- 26:25Tang - implementation
- 26:52Tang - protocol
- 27:39Tang - threats and caveats
- 29:50Unlock policy
- 30:01Shamir's Secret Sharing
- 38:29LUKS integration
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