Small-Box Cryptography
summary
Three-step recipe gives concrete security bounds for SPN/AES-style designs: a reduced-round proof, a hardness-amplification cascade, and the Big-to-Small Conjecture to extend proofs to tiny S-boxes. For a random S-box and any linear P-box whose inverse has no zeros, the aggressive conjecture yields security ~2^-8R/3 (about 1/100,000,000 at 10 rounds, and ~2^-64 at 24 rounds). Proofs use domain-extension results plus Moré-style cascade amplification; conjecture remains unproven.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:35What is AES?
- 1:22Can we Prove Security? PROOF
- 2:11Small-Box Cryptography
- 3:38CASE : SPNs (and AES)
- 4:46TRADITONAL CRYPTO: BIG-BOX
- 10:57Cascade of SPNS
- 12:30Preparing for Magic
- 14:05Big-to-Small Conjecture
- 15:13Big-to-Small Philosophy
- 17:56Stream Cipher (SC) Meets SBC
- 20:50Why Better than "AES is secure"?
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