Cursed yet Satisfied Agents
summary
Defines the Wallet Game and shows cursed agents act like rational bidders with a cursed valuation that mixes true and signal-conditioned value, so truthful bidding causes a winner's curse. Characterizes all deterministic Cursed-Exposed IC and IR mechanisms via threshold allocation and a modified payment identity, then adds a true-IR constraint that forces negative initial payments (compensation). Introduces a masking operation that raises thresholds to avoid compensation, proves impossibility for max-value auctions, and gives a half-efficiency guarantee for concave-sum valuations with many independent bidders.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:14Wallet Game
- 2:16The winner's curse (Literature)
- 4:13Auction Setting (single item)
- 4:48Direct mechanism
- 5:48What's wrong?
- 7:47Behavioral Equivalence
- 8:59Desirable Properties
- 12:28C-EPIC-IR mechanisms (Deterministic)+EPIR
- 15:12Compensation
- 16:17SW Optimization with Budget Balance
- 18:41Masking operation
- 19:43Optimal social welfare
- 21:32Revenue maximization
- 21:52Conclusion
