Interaction Preserving Compilers for Secure Computation
summary
A compiler converts an n‑round insecure protocol into a secure MPC with communication roughly equal to the original protocol (no multiplicative blowup, only an additive overhead plus polynomial dependence on the last message depth, output size and security parameter). Semi‑honest security holds in the CRS model under Circular‑LWE; two‑party compilation is round‑preserving (n→n) while M‑party needs one extra round unless one assumes extractable witness encryption and succinct NIZKs. The construction builds a rate-one multi-key FHE, combines laconic function evaluation, garbled circuits + witness encryption and extractable SNARKs, and meets malicious security with a minimum of four rounds in the plain model under standard extractability assumptions.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:14Secure Multiparty Computation
- 0:46Communication Complexity
- 8:21Starting Point: N+2 Rounds
- 9:33Improvements
- 10:30N+1 Rounds: Laconic Function Evaluation
- 12:54N Rounds for Two Parties
- 18:31N Rounds for M Parties: Extractability Assumptions
- 21:51Plain Model: Semi-Malicious Security
- 23:03Plain Model: Malicious Security
- 28:27Rate-1 MK Linearly Homomorphic Encryption
- 30:11Multi-Key Linear Homomorphism
- 31:34Achieving Rate-1
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