~/talk

How to Sell Information Optimally: an Algorithmic Study

Talkat ITCS 2021 · 2021-01-06..01-08
name:Yang Cai
links:none on file
links:none on file
slides:none on file

Provides an algorithmic characterization: when type distribution and payoff matrix are explicit the revenue-optimal menu is computable via a polynomial-size linear program; when actions are implicit but a best-response oracle exists and the number of states is constant there is an additive FPT algorithm that merges close signals and reduces the action set; without the oracle even two-state/two-action instances make it NP-hard to approximate revenue within any constant factor; extends model to multi-agent winner-selection with a reduced-form LP.

AI-written summary · about

  1. 0:00Intro
  2. 0:12Motivation
  3. 2:36Value of Information
  4. 6:43Selling Information vs. Auctions
  5. 8:54Single-agent: Explicit
  6. 11:30Single-agent: Implicit with BR oracle
  7. 13:49Single-agent: Implicit with succinct description
  8. 14:54Multi-agent: explicit
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