Black-Box Uselessness: Composing Separations in Cryptography
summary
Defines a composable notion called black-box uselessness and proves that infinitely-often one-way functions are useless for building key agreement when one party makes a constant number of OWF queries. Proof uses the Impagliazzo–Rudich style attack instantiated with a random oracle + PSPACE oracle, plus a case split that either inverts Z-relative functions or replaces the OWF by one built from Z; complexity analysis shows attacks blow up exponentially unless queries are constant.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00The cryptographic landscape
- 1:24Reductions and black boxes
- 4:04Black-box separations
- 6:44Limitations of current methods
- 8:44Defining black-box uselessness
- 11:03Contributions and framework
- 13:16Core results and conjectures
- 16:12Proof of separation
- 22:50Inherent complexity of security
- 25:40Technical proof limitations
- 35:38Future research directions
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