Keylime: Bootstrapping and Maintaining Trust
summary
Keylime uses TPM-based remote attestation to prove a machine’s boot and runtime integrity, performs measured boot (firmware, shim, kernel options, IMA) and then cryptographically releases secrets as an encrypted payload delivery only when PCRs match a provided whitelist. Verifier polls quotes about 2 seconds polling for continuous detection, scales to thousands of nodes, includes a revocation framework that fires Python local-action scripts and certificate revocation, and prototypes a Merkle-tree vTPM aggregation to extend a single hardware root of trust to many vTPMs; demos and a working VM/Ansible sandbox exist.
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chapters (31)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:26What is the problem
- 1:41The good thing
- 2:19The problem with it
- 4:26Lower level of the stack
- 4:43Trusted Platform Modules
- 4:54TPMS
- 6:50Signing artifacts
- 7:52Making artifacts public
- 8:26Remote attestation
- 8:46Scale
- 9:16TPM
- 9:28Keylime Origins
- 9:56Measured Boot
- 10:59IMA
- 12:24Encryption
- 14:31Components
- 17:04Hardware Root of Trust
- 24:46Encrypted Payload
- 26:08Continuous Integration
- 28:15Demo
- 30:11Examples
- 30:44Red Hat Demo
- 31:25Python Demo
- 32:26Meeting Notes
- 33:15Agent
- 33:44VMTPM
- 35:26Token System
- 39:39Test drive Keylime
- 40:38Whitelist and hashes
- 48:20Wrap up
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