Using TPMs to Cryptographically Verify Devices at Scale
summary
Google uses TPM-based remote attestation to give each workstation a hardware-backed identity and verify boot state across 25,000 machines, combining PCR values with the firmware/bootloader event log and verifying quotes signed by an attestation key chained to a manufacturer endorsement key via credential activation. Open source Go libraries implement client/server quote, event-log parsing and EK/AK linking; the flow verifies hashes and nonces, scales to fleets, supports TPM 1.2/2, and notes the limitation that runtime compromise after boot is not covered by static boot measurements.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:24Agenda
- 1:55Trust Problem
- 4:08What is a TPM
- 4:32Purpose of a TPM
- 7:33TPM functionality
- 12:48TPM endorsement keys
- 14:35Association keys
- 17:46Overview
- 23:25Open Source
- 23:43Go
- 32:56Questions
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