CoSMIX: A Compiler-based System for Secure Memory Instrumentation and Execution in Enclaves
Talkat USENIX ATC '19 · on Thursday, 2019-07-11· at 14:20· USENIX ATC Track II: Grand Ballroom VII–IX·
summary
A compiler instruments memory accesses to route regions to pluggable memory stores and a lightweight enclave runtime handles faults without costly enclave exits. Prototype runs on Intel SGX and integrates with SCONE and Graphene. Unmodified Redis/Memcached achieve ~2× throughput and handle datasets up to 6× enclave RAM using a self-paging store; SQLite with two annotations shows ~4.5× faster access versus no cache; ORAM overhead drops from 61× to 8.6× (or 5–5.8× when stacked with paging). Selective static instrumentation yields ~20% overhead on the Phoenix benchmark.
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