Security: from Transistors to Compilers
summary
AXI cut‑through lets masters hog the bus; a buffered Cut-and-Forward C parameter delays request propagation until C words are buffered, costing ~3–7% latency vs cut‑through and preventing memory DoS while avoiding the ~90% penalty of store‑forward, keeping deadlines with ~4–6% impact. A compiler analysis uses a DeltaM leak vector to capture implicit flows and finds 15/20 optimized binaries introduce new leaks. A foundry can tune self‑heating (Synopsys Sentaurus, 7nm/IMEC data) to build a self-heating Trojan triggers 3.8 months–3 years that flips gates and enables AES key extraction. FPGA Fruit‑80 cores reach 7.74 Gbps.
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chapters (18)
- 0:00Start
- 0:19Announcements
- 1:21Speaker Is Francesco Restoshia
- 3:19What Can Go Wrong
- 9:59Experimental Validation
- 12:25Summary
- 13:34Priyanka Panigrahi
- 14:12Quantifying Information Mechanics for Security Verification of Compiler Optimizations
- 16:07Paint Analysis
- 18:19Threat Model
- 19:19Leak Propagation Vector
- 23:22Three Quantification Parameters
- 30:46Outline of this Presentation
- 34:31Threat Landscape
- 36:43Evaluation Path
- 38:22Countermeasures
- 52:20Preliminary Results
- 1:00:26End of the Session
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