Outcome Oriented Security
summary
Argues for a six-step threat-model that goes from actors assets and actions to hazards via data-flow diagrams use cases and hazop analysis, producing concrete security objectives that enter requirements. Recommends the Trike tool and shows how modeling finds workflow and business-rule bugs before code. Pushes an assume compromise posture: detect notify recover, prefer heterogeneity, and remove whole classes of low-level bugs in frameworks so deployed systems actually work.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Start
- 1:07What is Security?
- 2:14What is a Security Objective?
- 3:17No one actually writes security objectives.
- 4:39What is a Threat Model?
- 7:48How do You Make a Threat Model?
- 15:41How: Failure Modes and Mitigations
- 17:30No threat model, no idea what security means Detect issues at the business rules level
- 26:19Outcome-Oriented Security, You, and Your Customer
- 30:58Usability and [In]Security
- 36:50The Exception: Bug-Class Killing and Platforms
- 38:21Your Responsibility to the Internets
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