Eleanor Saitta
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- Siren Hofvander5 talks
- Laura Bell13 talks
- Tanya Janca30 talks
- Aaron Bedra14 talks
- Kelly Shortridge10 talks
- Robert Carson3 talks
| title | conference | date |
|---|---|---|
| Security from zero | Agile on the Beach 2024 | 2024-07-04 |
Targeted at teams with ~10–200 engineers, this gives concrete starting moves: adopt YubiKeys (U2F) for phishing resistance, centralize logs and use canaries… | ||
| Principles For Secure & Reliable Systems | GOTO Aarhus 2023 | 2023-05-22 |
Principles and concrete practices for resilient security emphasize separating state and logic, making services immutable and ephemeral (example: short… | ||
| Security Styles | GOTO Amsterdam 2022 | 2022-06-12 |
Compares type 1 vs type 2 security and argues that proactive, system-first choices outperform policing and checkbox compliance: phishing leaderboards and… | ||
| Principles for Developing More Secure Systems | GOTO Chicago 2019 | 2019-04-29 |
Defines security as user goals disrupted by adversaries and gives concrete practices: use webauthn/YubiKey for phishing-resistant auth, centralize logs… | ||
| You got your design team in my security team! | Velocity 2016 Santa Clara | 2016-06-20 |
Argues that security lives at the system and human-impact level not the platform level, so systems not platforms is the guiding claim; notes lang sec doesn't… | ||
| Implementing security into an organization | Velocity 2016 Santa Clara | 2016-06-20 |
Most organizations treat security as bolted on or limited to testing and incident response, leaving almost no architectural security or formal security design… | ||
| Designing for Security Outcomes | Velocity Conference Amsterdam 2015 | 2015-10-28 |
Argues that security is about human outcomes, not just code, and prescribes concrete practices: use threat modeling early to catch requirement-level… | ||
| Outcome Oriented Security | RubyConf AU 2014 | 2014-02-19 |
Argues for a six-step threat-model that goes from actors assets and actions to hazards via data-flow diagrams use cases and hazop analysis, producing concrete… | ||
| nothing matches | ||